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ABSTRACT
Respected scholar, expert, public opinion maker, oracle, under-cover 
politician, charlatan, cartoon character – all roles “out there” waiting 
for scholars sharing knowledge with a wider public. Scholars of 
religion trying to carve out more room in the public arena for a non-
religious, scientific approach to religion always risk digging their 
graves as (respected) scholars. What’s worse, they also risk digging 
the grave for a valuable and respectable, as well as publicly valued 
and respected academic, scientific study of religion. The scholar 
popularizing scientifically based knowledge, not least via the mass 
media (daily newspapers or public television), may “become” political 
and controversial to such a degree that s/he becomes a problem for 
the scientific study of religion, the community of scholars of religion, 
and the university with which s/he is affiliated. The otherwise valuable 
engagement threatens the reputation of science as being something 
valuable, “pure” and “neutral,” elevated above the dirty business 
of politics and power. In spite of the risks, the engaged scholar, it is, 
however, also argued, actually can help to strengthen the position, 
inside and outside the academy, of scientifically based knowledge 
and of the critical, analytical, scientific study of religion.
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Introduction
In the abstract to his 2005 article “The Politics of Wishful Thinking? Disentangling 
the Role of the Scholar-Scientist from that of the Public Intellectual in the Modern 
Academic Study of Religion”, Canadian scholar of religion Donald Wiebe wrote:
Although religion may well have relevance for various social, political, economic, 
cultural, and other related issues in society, I will argue here that this does not 
oblige the academic student of religion to become engaged with those matters. 
Indeed, to do so – not as a citizen but as a member of the academic guild which 
has responsibility to the field/discipline of Religious Studies and the modern 
research university at large – is to fuse and therefore confuse advocacy and 
scholarship. The task of the student of religion, qua scientist, is to seek to 
understand and to explain religion and religions, not to create the good society 
(Wiebe, 2005, p. 7).
With reference to e.g. Weber’s “teachings” about the (ideal) separation of and 
difference between value-free scholarship of communication thereof and a value 
judgment (be it religious, moral or political), Wiebe warns about the risks implied if 
the scholar becomes a public intellectual. The fundamental risk, he argues, is that it 
“may well put academic credibility of this discipline into question” (Wiebe, 2005, p. 8). 
Moreover, he warns, “[r]eligious and political goals [...] are replacing the scientific 
agenda of seeking disinterested knowledge about religion and religions” (Ibid.).
Wiebe, in this article, attacks not only religio-theologian public intellectuals but 
also scholar of religion Russell T. McCutcheon. Wiebe, as also e.g. Ivan Strenski, 
opines that McCutcheon has become spokesman for an activist and anti-religious 
application of the study of religion, which, at the end of the day, is no better than a 
religious-theological pro-religious approach (Strenski, 2006, p. 339 ff.). En passant, 
one may, however, note that McCutcheon, the same year he is criticized by Wiebe, 
directs a not dissimilar criticism against another US scholar of religion, Bruce Lincoln 
(2005). McCutcheon (2005) criticizes Lincoln for – in regard to his study-of-religions 
based critical analyses of e.g. the rhetoric of former US President Bush – for abusing 
his academic title and status to legitimize what, at the end of the day, are his personal 
political opinions and agenda. An accusation not dissimilar to the one directed at me 
by Danish daily Jyllands-Posten (JP) in the debate following the publication of the 
Muhammad cartoons. Let us therefore, before we get back to some key methodological 
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issues take a look at religion scholar Jensen’s role(s) in the debate pertaining to the 
Muhammad cartoons. As a case. 
The Cartoons: Islam-Bashing or Freedom-Fighting – or Raising a Debate?
September 30, 2005, JP1 published “The Face of Muhammed” containing twelve 
cartoons2, including one of a man with a bomb and the Islamic creed in his turban. 
Mentioning what he considers examples of self-censorship due to fear for Muslim 
reactions, culture editor Flemming Rose concludes:
The public space is being intimidated. Artists, authors, illustrators, translators 
and people in the theatre are therefore steering a wide berth around the most 
important meeting of cultures in our time – the meeting between Islam and the 
secular society of the West, which is rooted in Christianity. [...] Some Muslims 
reject modern, secular society. They demand a special position, insisting on 
special consideration for their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with 
secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one has to be ready to put 
up with scorn, mockery and ridicule (Director of Public Prosecutions, 2006; trans. 
and italics mine)3.
“The Face of Muhammed” inspired heated debates4. About freedom of expression 
versus religion and religious sensibilities (especially Islam and Muslim sensibilities) 
and about religious versus secular worldviews, and the Muslim world versus the West. 
These debates are ongoing, often including issues pertaining to the refugees from 
Muslim countries, and often framing controversies in terms of “culture wars”.
Reasons for this and for the events, including the violent ones5, that unfolded in 
late January and early February 2006, are many6. One obvious reason is that quite a 
few Muslims did feel provoked and offended, and that some of them did see “The Face 
of Muhammed” as part of a defamatory campaign directed against Islam and Muslims7.
1 https://jyllands-posten.dk/
2 I use “cartoons” rather than “drawings” because this is the term most frequently used to refer to the 
drawings and the “affair” in question. The letter from Rose to members of the Danish newspapers illustrators’ 
union invited them to “draw” Muhammad as they “saw” him (twelve out of forty responded positively by 
submitting the published drawings).
3 Flemming Rose, when looking back in 2019 characterizes his then position as somewhat “naïve” (or 
too black and white) (Krasnik, 2019).
4 For analyses, debates and documents with specific regard to Denmark, see Jensen 
(2006a/2006b/2006c), Jerichow and Rode (2006), Rothstein and Rothstein (2006), Larsen and Seidenfaden 
(2006), cf. also Repp (2006), and Modood et al. (2006).
5 That the controversy was also played out in threats, violent protests, and even in killings, must be 
mentioned because those reactions became part of the debates. However, the number of Muslims engaged 
in street fighting was next to zero compared to those who watched such happenings on TV.
6 Cf. Jensen (2006a; 2006c) for interpretations of some reasons and contexts.
7 This is true for the Danish Muslims travelling to the Middle East in late 2005 as well as for the eleven 
ambassadors who wrote a letter (October 12, 2005) to the Danish Prime Minister referring to what they saw 
as an “ongoing smear campaign”.
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Another reason is that quite a few of non-Muslims, including Islamophobs, 
considered the reactions of some Muslims, especially the violent ones, as a proof 
that JP had been right from the beginning: freedom of expression was under siege, 
threatened by fanatical Muslims or by Islam as such. In their view the cultural war 
against these Muslims had to be intensified8. 
Other non-Muslims, though equally critical about the violent protests and in favour 
of freedom of expression, warned that freedom of expression should not be taken as 
an absolute right, and that dominant discourses on Islam tended towards legitimating 
almost any kind of verbal attack on Islam and Muslims. The publication of the cartoons 
in JP was an unnecessary demonstration of power and cultural hegemony directed 
against an already marginalized minority. The cartoons, in their view, were but one 
more example of Islam-bashing dressed up as freedom fighting9. 
At the time when the “affair” turned into a crisis (late January 2006), with fighting 
in the streets and boycotts of Danish goods, JP published a statement saying 
that JP regretted that the cartoons had been offensive to Muslims. That had never 
been the intention. “At the time they had not”, editor Rose wrote in Washington Post 
February 19, 2006, “realized the extent of the issue’s sensitivity for the Muslims, who 
live in Denmark and the millions of Muslims around the world”. He had only “tried 
to test the limits of self-censorship by calling on cartoonists to challenge a Muslim 
taboo”. And, repeating what he had written in the article of September 30, 2005, he 
added that Muslims, like everybody else, have to put up with “scorn, mockery and 
ridicule” (Rose, 2006).
JP was adamant in insisting that the newspaper never intended to offend Muslims. 
Interpretations differing from this official statement have either been totally rejected 
or labelled as “mean lies”, and JP has proven to be extremely zealous in countering 
opinions differing from their own10. The publication of the cartoons was solely intended 
to provoke a debate on the conceived threat to freedom of expression. It was an act of 
resistance to this threat and an act of freedom fighting11. 
8 A group of intellectuals and opinion makers promoting such opinions were gathered in the so-called 
Trykkefrihedsselskab (cf. below). Some (Brix & Hansen, 2002; Brix, Hansen & Hedegaard, 2003; Pittelkow, 
2002) published influential books on the perceived Islamic threat. Similar opinions can be found amongst 
politicians and political parties. Dansk Folkeparti (“The Danish People’s Party”) is the most famous, but in 
Denmark as elsewhere in Europe others have come into being, e.g. Sverigedemokraterne and Alternative f. 
Deutschland. See e.g. Andreassen (2005), Jensen (2006a/2006c), Hervik (1999/2002/2006), and Hussain 
(2000) for instances of Islamophobic discourse in Denmark.
9 This view comes close to the qualified opinions of e.g. former minister of Foreign Affairs, U. Ellemann-
Jensen (2007), and former editor-in-chief of Politiken, a Copenhagen-based daily, T. Seidenfaden (2007). 
Cf. Repp (2006), Larsen and Seidenfaden (2006), Hedetoft (2006), Rothstein and Rothstein (2006), and 
Skadegaard (2006). The view of Jensen (2006a/2006c) is in line with this view, though I suggest that JP had 
several motives, including the one claimed by the newspaper itself.
10 JP in some cases accused the “offender” of defamation and slander. This was the case with the 
lawyer who, on behalf of some Muslims, filed a complaint against JP for defamation and slander.
11 Consequently, JP, Rose and supporters were pleased when Rose was awarded the “Sappho 
Prize” by the mentioned (see note 8) Trykkefrihedsselskabet (“Free Speech Society”) March 27, 2007. 
Trykkefrihedsselskabet was established in 2004 with the aim of defending freedom of expression, not least 
against attacks from religious groups.
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The Cartoons: Jensen vs. Jyllandsposten, or Jensen vs. Juste
Episode 1:
September 30, 2005, a journalist phoned to ask my opinion on a project of JP to 
have illustrators draw Muhammad. I said that irrespective of the not unanimous 
prohibition against making drawings of Muhammad, some Muslims no doubt would 
take offense and see it as a provocation and thus get angry with JP. I added that I 
personally saw no reason for publishing such images: the Muslim minority had been 
the object of more than enough Islam-bashing. But, of course: JP had the right to 
freedom of expression.
I was not informed that the cartoons had actually been published on the very 
same day! 
Episode 2:
Next time I got involved was late January 2006 when the whole thing had become 
regular front-page news due to demonstrations, burning down of embassies, etc. 
Sunday January 30, 2006, the face of scholar Jensen with a headline “Jyllands-Posten 
was warned” covered the front page of Politiken (Høy-Jensen, 2006), a daily critical of 
JP ’s publication of the cartoons. In the article, I, “leading scholar of religion” – having 
been phoned on the day before by a journalist from Politiken saying she had had an 
anonymous email according to which JP had contacted Jensen before publishing the 
cartoons, asking his qualified opinion about possible Muslim reactions to drawings 
of the prophet – was correctly quoted as having answered JP journalist that it was 
his guess that some Muslims would take offense. Incorrectly, though, this front-page 
article also presented me as warning JP that the drawings might lead to “violent 
protest”. These words had, moreover, been inserted in the article after I reviewed and 
accepted the quotes right after the interview!  
With this photo, headline and article, I got my break-through as a religion scholar-
expert, and the same evening, scholar Jensen, but now also “warner-oracle” Jensen 
appeared on al-Jazeera as a Danish Muslim told his Muslim brothers that JP, thanks to 
Jensen, actually knew very well what they were doing – and had done.
Episode 3: 
JP denied ever having contacted, not to say consulted me, postulating that Jensen 
himself “made up” the front-page “story”: a media-stunt! A journal for journalism 
followed up on the story, and after a series of denials from JP, they finally (mid-
February) found an JP editor who admitted that a journalist had called Jensen. But, 
they said, she had called in regard to another matter, only, at the end of the interview, 
mentioning the cartoons en passant. I was not quite happy with this version but did not 
react: I was primarily relieved that my memory had not played me a trick. I had been 
asked my opinion by JP, and I had said almost what I remembered saying.
Alas! In early March a journalist from JP called again. They have retrieved a 
tape recording of that interview, and it “proved” that the interview had taken place 
not before the publication of the cartoons but on the very same day. They admitted 
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that I had had but the very best reasons to think so, but that, of course, did not matter 
much to them. 
What mattered, though, not least to me, was that JP, in another front-page 
headline, a few days later triumphantly “revealed” that leading scholar of religion 
Jensen had been wrong: JP had not been warned. Though JP did mention that I had 
good reasons for remembering as I did, the whole story, of course, made readers 
wonder: is Jensen (ever) telling the truth?
Seeds of suspicion were sown, and details of the story, to this day, have never 
been told in the Danish dailies. 
Episode 4: 
September 3, 2006, a JP journalist presented a “top 20-list” of academic experts 
frequently quoted in Danish media during the cartoon crisis. The article, “Experts: 
Oracles”, claims that the influence of experts on public opinion is considerable, raising 
the question to what degree the experts “fall prey to the temptation of propagating 
political messages under cover of an academic title?” (Hundevadt, 2006a). Each of 
the 20 was evaluated according to some (undisclosed) criteria of the journalist: To 
what a degree does s/he present academic, neutral analyses and to what degree 
private or political opinions? 
Jensen came in number ten, said to, with another scholar of religion, “swing the 
baton in a more general debate on religion”. Number one and a few others are judged 
to be predominantly “objective” commentators, Islam scholar Bæk Simonsen to be 
predominantly a debater. Jensen is judged to be fifty-fifty. Bæk Simonsen and Jensen 
and a few others (with no documentation) are said to have been “among the most 
severe and unrelenting critics of the drawings of Jyllands-Posten and the way the 
Danish government handled the situation”. 
This article foreshadowed the core of the criticism and accusations (see the 
bibliography for relevant references) later raised against several scholars, not least 
Jensen, by JP, but also by MP Naser Khader, a leading politician, as well by leading 
MPs from The Danish People’s Party.
Episode 5:
October 14, 2006, Politiken publishes “From Scorn to Hysteria?” (Korsgaard, 2006), 
an article that, via interviews with several scholars, Jensen being one, focuses on 
differences and similarities between JP’s Muhammad cartoons and later incidents in 
which various groups of people ridiculed Muhammad by way of caricatures. Jensen – 
originally turning down the journalist because she first asked his (personal) opinion 
rather than a qualified opinion as a scholar on how “insightful Muslims in Denmark” might 
possibly think about the various incidents in comparison to (what they thought about) the 
JP cartoons – said that he was fairly certain such Muslims would think that there was an 
important difference (discussed below) between the cartoons and later “happenings”. If 
this reference to what insightful Muslims might think is not taken seriously or neglected, 
the article can be read as expressing Jensen’s (own) opinion on the publication of the 
cartoons by JP rather than his understanding of the opinion of some Muslims.
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Episode 6: 
Soon after this article, Carsten Juste, editor-in-chief of JP, wrote scholar Jensen, 
with a copy to JP’s lawyer and the Vice-Chancellor of Jensen’s university. The letter 
reproduced the quotations from the article in which Jensen commented that some 
(“insightful”) Muslims might infer that the cartoons were “published deliberately to 
mock and ridicule an altogether central and sacred figure in Islam”, and “to lecture 
other people and to say ‘You have not at all reached our level of civilisation, and now 
we will teach You how to act’”, and that the drawings, “were produced to openly and in 
public tread on somebody’s toes”. These statements, the letter from Juste said, were 
untrue. Juste went on accusing Jensen of having, on more than one occasion, used 
his academic title, along with “dirty tricks and shady methods”, to cast aspersions on 
JP and “promote certain political ideas” (From the letter in Jensen’s custody).
Finding this letter rather intimidating, I did not respond. Instead, I wrote my Vice-
Chancellor asking him to write to Juste expressing the university’s unanimous support, 
stressing the right of Jensen and other scholars to express themselves freely in the 
media. I did not get the support I wanted: the Vice-Chancellor responded, inter alia, 
that “if one participates in the Islam-debate, one no doubt cannot avoid running into 
trouble [...]”. He ended saying – as his “personal opinion” – that he finds it important for 
everybody to try his best to make sure that his opinions are based on facts more than 
on (personal) attitudes. “I know”, he concluded, “that it is hard to strike that balance, 
and that not all readers will agree whether it has been struck or not” (From the letter in 
Jensen’s custody).
Episode 7:
Juste and JP clearly did not think I had struck the balance. December 17, 2006, in an 
interview with a JP journalist Kim Hundevadt, Juste, now in public, attacked me and 
other scholars: “They lie about the motives of JP for publishing the cartoons”, he said, 
“and they abuse their titles to pursue political aims” (Hundevadt, 2006b). In the case of 
Jensen, said Juste, we have to do with nothing but mean political points of view, with 
no scientific basis at all. 
Receiving no response from me, Juste wrote the Vice-Chancellor directly. The 
Vice-Chancellor advised JP to file a complaint to the university’s Ethics Committee if 
JP intended to accuse Jensen of bad “scientific practice”.
Episode 8:
On December 17, JP actually did so, stressing that JP did not question the right 
of Jensen to freedom of expression. No, the complaint was solely directed at 
his behaviour as a scholar. JP requested that the Committee consider whether 
Jensen had deliberately abused his academic credibility to propagate his personal 
opinions.
Together with my legal advisers I was of the opinion that the Committee should 
decline to deal with the complaint. The issue had nothing to do with “scientific 
dishonesty” or “bad practice” as defined in the Committee’s mandate. The Committee, 
nevertheless, opened the case, requesting me to respond to the complaint.
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In my response, I stated that the affair and complaint raised interesting and 
relevant methodological questions, familiar to the philosophy of science and of 
great importance to scholars, the community of scholars, and to the universities. I, 
furthermore, pointed out that scholars, according to the Danish University Act, are 
obliged to share their knowledge with the wider community, and that the university is 
obliged to encourage employees to engage in public debates. Finally, the response 
stated that I had (good) reasons for saying what I did, adding that nothing prevented 
me from expressing interpretations of JP’s motives differing from the declarations by 
JP itself.
Episode 9:
The Committee concluded that the issue raised did not fall within the mandate of the 
Committee. While several media outlets had written extensively about the case, the 
acquittal of scholar Jensen made no headlines, nor did it ever figure on the website 
of my university. Apart from a follow-up article in the journal of my labour union, it 
was only JP that made a story out of it. JP did so by way of an editorial “I Løgnens 
Tjeneste” (“In the Service of Lie” or “Serving Falsehood”) (Editorial, 2007b). While 
acknowledging the support expressed for me by the Practice Committee and Vice 
Chancellor, it nevertheless continued to accuse me of having abused my role as 
scholar and the “authority” of my office:
Like everybody else, Tim Jensen has the right to criticize Jyllands-Posten. The 
problem is, however, that he persists in his mendacious accusations in spite of 
his knowing better, and, even worse, he does so “on the background of years of 
research”, therewith clothing his lies with a cloak of scientific authority. And here 
we thought that a scholar holding a university office was supposed to strive for 
the truth (Editorial, 2007b).
Episode 10:
As you can see, everything was now ready for scholar-expert-warner-oracle-public 
opinion maker-undercover politician and liar Jensen to take upon him one more role, 
that of a character in a cartoon, a laughing-stock. All it took was for JP to link it to their—
at the same time – ongoing smearing campaign against Jensen’s colleague Mikael 
Rothstein: the two of us started to appear as characters in JP’s daily satirical cartoon. 
For more than a week, two figures were inserted, in a most unusual way, into cartoons 
commenting on other political and cultural happenings.
Rothstein was cast as a missionary man, named “The Hornblower”, with 
a Watchtower-like magazine in his hand. The other, Liar Jensen, next to “The 
Hornblower”, was portrayed as constantly trying to convince readers that he was not 
lying, e.g. saying: “I am not lying when I say that the Hornblower is a wise guy!” 
This series of cartoons was brought to an end in an almost ingenious way: 
commenting on the political turmoil caused by a new political party, the cartoonist 
portrayed the parties as ships and boats sailing a stormy ocean. In the shape of a 
shark, the new party cruised the waters while ships and boats manned with leaders 
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of the old parties were either about to sink or boldly riding the waves. Inserted into the 
background, left behind on a proverbial deserted island, are the two scholars, hanging 
on to the lonely palm tree, crying out: “We are still here!”
Some Methodological Reflections
Several episodes have been omitted in this brief exposé, and only some key 
methodological issues can be mentioned in what follows. Allow me to first get back to 
Wiebe (2005), who at the same time as he wrote as quoted above, also seems to find 
it alright, nay even valuable and good, if the scholar of religion contributes to public 
debates about religion. The scholar of religion, he writes, can very well point out and 
demonstrate “the relevance that knowledge about religions and religion may have for 
policy issues in the public square” (Weibe, 2005, p. 9), and he ends: 
The academic student of religion qua human being [...] is more than merely a 
scholar/scientist; s/he is also a citizen with socio-political, economic and other 
personal concerns that go beyond science and the agenda of the modern 
research university, and there is no reason why s/he should not, as an ordinary 
citizen, engage in the debates related to such concerns in the public square. 
Moreover, the scholarly/scientific expertise of the engaged academic may even 
have some instrumental relevance to the achievement of particular social goals, 
even if these goals involve metaphysical and/or religious assumptions, beliefs 
and commitments (Weibe, 2005, p. 34).
I think, just like Wiebe, that it is in the interest of the “public good” if the scholar of 
religion makes his expertise and academic knowledge available to the public, using it 
to qualify, correct and inform the public and political debate. I also agree with Wiebe 
that the broader role of public intellectual, however, as well as direct efforts to promote 
religious or explicit or narrowly party political aims rather than efforts to communicate 
sound knowledge about religion can turn out to be very counterproductive as regards 
the reputation of the science of religion – and equally counterproductive in regard to a 
society in need of scientifically based knowledge about religion. 
But I do not share the optimism of Wiebe when he seems to think that “we” 
are on the safe side as long as the scholar avoids playing the role of a public 
intellectual (who can express an opinion on almost everything at debate) and avoid 
using his scholarship to promote religious or specific political agendas. I, on the 
contrary, claim, based on, on the one hand, some 25 years of experience, the case 
rendered above being central to this experience, as an expert to the media on 
things religious (religio-political/religio-social/religio-cultural), and, on the other, on 
general methodological arguments, that the “renommé” and value of the science of 
religion can also be put at risk when the scholar tries his best to be a classical expert 
communicating sound knowledge. 
The boundaries between the various roles a scholar can play (or be “accused” 
of playing) are porous, and the scholar cannot always decide what role he comes to 
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play. Quite often he will be seen as politicizing, promoting some kind of agenda, e.g. 
an apologetical pro-Islam agenda. This holds good, of course, also when the scholar, 
just like me, Bruce Lincoln, and e.g. Ira Chernus (see ahead), is of the personal and 
political opinion, that the public debate and good not infrequently is suffering from 
a lack of basic knowledge of facts, a lack of historical, comparative, and analytical-
critical distance and approach to religion (inter alia to Islam), and that the scholar 
therefore as an engaged citizen cannot but engage himself in the public debate. 
It also holds good if the scholar is of the opinion, as I am, that scientifically 
founded knowledge and critical-analytical competences also as regards religion is 
a sine qua non for an enlightened, pluralistic, and open-democracy12. A stance no 
doubt making it very difficult to draw a line between, on the one side, the scholar-
expert sharing his academic knowledge with the public at large, and, on the other, 
the scholar-citizen (citizen-scholar) struggling to promote a political agenda, namely 
the agenda he finds in line with his vision of the good society. It is, I claim, not 
easy, if at all possible, whether in theory or practice, to uphold a “wall of separation” 
between the scientific-academic and the political-ideological when it comes to 
communicating religion-related research-based knowledge and qualified opinions 
to the public at large. 
I would like to emphasize that the basics of what I say now 2019, I said also in 1998, 
e.g. in the US religion journal The Bulletin in an article on “The Scholar of Religion as 
a Cultural Critic: Perspectives from Denmark” (Jensen, 1998)13.
Yet, important changes have come about, primarily due to 9/11, the London and 
Madrid bombings, the Cartoon case, the Charlie Hebdo killings, as well later terrorist 
killings and attacks in Paris, in Copenhagen and elsewhere. The entire debate on 
Islam and Muslims has become more poisonous, religion and not least Islam more 
“securitized”. Discussions about the (im-)possibility of the integration of Islam or 
Muslim immigrants into the “Western” democratic political systems and societies have 
not become less frequent and polarized, often drawing on and recycling well known 
Islamophobic and anti-Muslim stereotypes, generalisations and reifications. Add to 
this, e.g. in Denmark, years of public “Islam-bashing”, also from leading politicians 
and political parties, for decades from or inspired by the Danish People’s Party, a right-
wing party and the parliamentary basis for the government 2001–2010 and beyond. 
A party that made anti-Muslimism and xenophobia central to its own as well as to the 
government’s policy. Today’s social-democratic (2019–) government to a large degree 
has copy pasted its politics of anti-Muslim immigration of the past government and the 
Danish People’s Party, at the same time as even more outspoken anti-Muslim political 
parties has come into being. 
These changes are important changes, and it is noteworthy that the Danish 
association of scholars on Islam did not call for a conference on the implications of 
12 Cf. the more elaborate argument in e.g. Jensen (2017).
13 Thus, this article is not the first one from my hand that deals with relevant methodological issues, nor 
is it the first that does so with special regard to the Muhammad cartoon affair. It is, though, the first to do so 
in a more comprehensive manner in English. Consequently, though parts of this article are new, others are 
identical to, or another version of, earlier writings, the titles of which can be found in the references.
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the politicization of the study of Islam in 1998, the year of my article in The Bulletin. 
They did so, however, in 2007, and today, with continued criticism of Danish Islam-
scholarship not being “critical” enough as regards the so-called dark sides of Islam, 
discussions among scholars on these issues have become commonplace. 
The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, likewise, did not find 
it necessary in 1998 to publish a booklet on Academic Freedom and Freedom of 
Expression at the Universities. In 2007 they did, and they did so, inter alia, because 
of what happened to scholars on religion and Islam during and after the cartoon affair. 
Nevertheless: Basics are, as said, more or less, the same: Jensen (1998) wrote: 
“The present re-politization of religion leads to a re-politization of the study of religion, 
or at least to a re-consideration of the political implications of our work.” Maybe one 
can add that “the on-going mediatization of the public sphere and of politics and of 
religion” need must lead the scholar of religion to carefully consider the ways in which 
he “shares” academic knowledge with the public at large. The discourse of and within 
the academia is not the same as the discourse of the media and the journalists, – and 
the discourse of the scholar-experts to the media may therefore come out as some 
strange liminal “beast”, betwixt and between. 
 Though many, including scholars of religion, are able to uphold the role of a 
classical expert (see below), doing a great job to the benefit of both research and 
society while communicating via mass media and participating in the public debate, 
the road from respected and trustworthy “leading” scholar to disrespected and 
untrustworthy scholar and public opinion maker is not long. When well-meaning 
experts participate in public, politicized and charged debates, there is always a risk 
that they may undermine the otherwise existing respect for scientific knowledge. 
Mentioning “values” and “value-free”, and thinking about Wiebe and other 
scholars referring to Max Weber, I recall sociologist of religion Ole Riis’ contribution 
to a conference in Aarhus in 1998 on Værdier i religionsforskning og – undervisning 
i Danmark (“Values  in the Study of Religion and Religious Education”). Riis 
discussed – inter alia in continuation of a critical review of claims of and aspirations 
for objectivity and neutrality, as well as discussions on the (Weberian) ideal of a “wall 
of separation” between fact and value, or value freedom in scientific research and 
personal, political and social commitments – what he thought might be a historical, 
logical, and unavoidable link between intrinsic scientific values and external, 
social, or political values. Riis, as I understood him (cf. Jensen, 2001, pp. 41–42), 
emphasized the value of having the scholar influence the (value) “charged” and 
anything but value neutral public debate, at the same time as Riis distanced himself 
from “debaters who are so eager to highlight their values (preferences)  in public that 
the factual basis [of their research based intervention] is gets into the background”. 
Riis concluded saying that research (as a social institution) has “a responsibility to 
put forward the relevant factual knowledge, without obscuring its linked values” (as 
cited in Albinus et al., 2001, p. 32).
What Riis said was familiar to me but not at the time to many others. At the same 
conference (Jensen, 2001, pp. 41–42), I formulated an invitation to the scholar of 
religion 
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to participate in the public debate and apply his research in defense of a pluralistic 
and secular society that accepts the distanced attitude to religious phenomena 
practiced by the scientific study of religion.
This, in fact, has been my “activist” agenda ever since: promoting the scientific 
study of religion, its approaches and the knowledge accumulated, on the one hand, 
and the secular, democratic, pluralistic society, and public space that would not 
function if it did not give room to both the science of religion and religion. 
But today, as before, I find it important to continue the discussion on the many 
problems associated with doing what I (and Riis) think the scholar of religion should 
do. To, as prescribed by Riis, “present factual knowledge, without obscuring its 
linked values”, is easier said than done. The scholar can, of course, decide to share 
knowledge or to participate in the public debate only in the form of, for example, essays 
or letters-to-the editor, where he as the author is in control of the final product, except 
as regards context and maybe headline. However, if he makes himself available to 
journalists who, for example, call him for an opinion, he can and should check quotes. 
But what about “indirect” quotes, i.e. the summarizing of the journalist, of e.g. half-an- 
hour of conversation, into a few two-line quotes, and what about the other part of the 
text written by the journalist that clearly refers to the conversation? What about the 
context, the heading, the subtitle? 
And, what about interviews for radio or TV with half-an-hour’s interview cut to 
30 seconds? Without a possibility to check the final product and make objections. 
What about statements to media in faraway countries? Even if direct and indirect 
quotes are checked, you can be surprised about the result. It certainly also makes a 
difference if an interview and a statement appear in a front-page story or on certain 
page, with a photo of the scholar or without.
The “language” of the media is, as emphasized by Tim Murphy (2001), different 
from that of the scholarly community, and as pointed out by Klaus Kjøller (2007) in 
connection with JP vs. Rothstein, the scholar, moreover, comes, willingly or not, to 
play a role in a dramatic and dramatizing media “world”, where a scholar who wants 
to get through to the audience has to appear as a “whole person”, thus not just as 
a scholar-expert. Moreover, journalists in many cases ask for not just expertise and 
qualified knowledge. In addition to that they also ask for a “qualified opinion”. And, 
even if the qualified opinion is fact- and research based, it is, as I once stated in an 
interview (Young, 2006), nevertheless an opinion, and thus not barely part of the 
political debates. 
It actually seems to be a general feature of a recent (1961–2001) development 
that social science scholars in particular but also human science scholars are 
increasingly used as experts, at the same though also increasingly assuming (or 
being “assigned”) various kinds of roles (cf. Albæk et al., 2002). One is the “classical” 
expert role, the scholar delivering “factual knowledge, concrete, professionally-
based assessments and corrections to claims that concern the public”, cases 
in which the scholar’s “special knowledge and insight enriches the [...] the public 
debate”. In direct contrast to this, you find the researcher who writes essays, op-eds, 
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letter-to-the editor etc., which are nothing but, and also meant to be nothing but, 
“pure political comments”. 
But, as the report continues, the scholar increasingly appears in a mix of the two 
roles, “both informing and giving a value-based comment”, and it is most likely this mix 
that has given scholars and scholarship a new and more significant role. It should also 
be mentioned, as in the report mentioned, that journalists in this way can more easily 
appear as “neutral” reporters, leaving it to the expert-scholar to express an opinion. 
An expert presenting not just brief and accurate information, but also qualified and 
controversial opinions are, as also noticed by Kjøller (2007), often preferable to the 
one who “just” provide “naked facts”. 
A propos, “naked facts”: That too is, of course, not as simple as it might seem at 
a first glance. Just think of the scholar who – on the basis of repeated claims made in 
public by e.g. politicians that Muslims are overflooding Denmark, that there are at least 
800,000 Muslims in Denmark, and that they are all fanatically religious – comments 
on this by way of providing the facts that can correct the erroneous claims and thus 
qualify the debate. The scholar in the “classical” and neutral expert role. Yes, but also 
a scholar who enters and becomes part of the political debate for and against Islam, 
for and against immigration of Muslims, etc. 
The boundaries between the “classical” expert, the expert-opinion maker, and 
the politicizing expert-opinion maker is, as said above, porous, and it is not rarely very 
hard if at all possible for a scholar-expert to uphold or signal these boundaries or the 
transition from one to another role.
Another problem is linked to the fact that the scholar-expert is not just used as an 
expert in a specific and narrow field but also as a “generalist”-expert. Thus, for example, 
both Rothstein and Jensen as scholars of religion can (be asked to) comment on matters 
which strictly speaking are not matters pertaining to their narrower research field, be 
it to Islam and Christianity or to religious developments (including political debates 
about religion) in Denmark. Though this generalist-expert role is, I think, perfectly in line 
with the competences of a classical scholar of religion, actually an expert in “religion 
in general”, and though the comparative-historical perspective applied to specific 
contemporary instances of what is called religion is extremely valuable and important 
as regard the qualification of the public debate on religion, it does, of course, also imply 
some risks – for example, if the generalist-expert for some reason is accused of not 
being an expert in regard to the matter at hand, e.g. Islam or Christianity. It is difficult for 
many people to understand that one can also be an expert on religion in general and 
on “religion” in public discourses, and that a generalist-comparative perspective on say 
Islam or Christianity can shed a lot of new light on this religion and the debates about it. 
It is an important task, I think, for the scholar of religion to provide critical analysis 
not just of “religion(s) out there” but of the public debate on religion. In many cases, 
this is actually what journalists ask for and would like to qualified opinions on. Religion 
is a public and political phenomenon and today a highly politicized public matter, and 
the researcher who may well provide factual knowledge is also asked, based on his 
knowledge, his opinion on e.g. some political action. Is it a “smart move”, is it out of line 
with the “facts on the ground”, etc.? 
346 Tim Jensen
The scholar-expert can of course choose not to answer such a question, but 
he can also choose to say that this or that political move, in view of his analysis and 
knowledge, seems more or less based on facts or not, seems more or less wise or 
strategic. Certainly, a role fraught with dangers, not least in a “post-factual period” or 
in countries, like Denmark, where e.g. the government in power from 2000–2010 time 
and again has frowned at experts accusing them of being but “nitpicking”.
The accusations levelled against me and other researchers at the time of the 
cases mentioned, namely that they (ab-)used their academic titles to give their 
personal political opinions a higher degree of credibility entail a linked yet implicit 
claim: scholars operating in the public space as experts should not be allowed to 
do so unless they are able to demonstrate that their statements are based on facts, 
good arguments, the results of a specific research project, etc. Implicit in these claims, 
some of which (e.g. that one ought not and cannot give a qualified comment unless it 
is based on a quite specific and explicitly linked research project) most certainly, as 
indicated above, are based upon a limited understanding of what it means to be an 
expert and a scholar on religion. 
However, implicit are also other ideas (shared also by some scholars) about 
science and the role and function of the scientist/scholar. One such widespread 
and deeply held idea is that not just the scientific research process but also the 
dissemination of the research results, also via mass media, must and can be totally 
“objective”, “neutral”, and “value-free”. According to the same cluster of ideas, science 
can and must be kept completely separate from all personal and political ideologies 
and statements. If it is not Dr. Jensen, the scholar of religion from the University of 
Southern Denmark, who puts forward objective facts and conclusions derived from 
objective and neutral research, then it is Mr. Jensen, who propagates his own personal 
opinion, and in that case it is bad and wrong, at least if it is not stated loud and clearly: 
“I now do not speak as Dr. Jensen, the scholar of religion, but as Mr. Jensen, the 
engaged citizen”. 
Included is, thus, a notion of a neat and clear difference between, on the one 
hand, the scientist and, on the other, the private person, debater, and the citizen. The 
former completely neutral and the latter “biased” due to his ethical, political or religious 
preferences. You either speak as a scholar or as a private person. 
Wiebe (2005), cf. the introductory remarks, seems to share this view at least 
partially. But while Wiebe, no doubt, is well aware that this notion or idea has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate, and that questions pertaining to apolitical, objective, 
neutral, and value-free research, as well as to the dissemination of research results 
or scholarly knowledge is immensely complex, then neither JP nor Khader seemed 
aware of it. 
As noted by Kærgård et al. (2007, p. 25), the discussion of “what scientists should 
and should not say in the public debate” reflects a conception of science that science 
has largely left behind, namely, that “Science” (with a capital S) holds the ultimate 
truth, not to be discussed. A conception, accordingly, which, paradoxically, places 
research results somewhere far “beyond and above the public debate” (Kærgård et 
al., 2007, p. 26).
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Fact and value, as well as science and politics, can at times be sharply separated 
from each other. At times, though, it is not so. Neither in theory nor in practice. It is 
often equally impossible to separate the scholar from the individual person. A scholar 
is not just a scholar eight hours a day, but rather 24–7. To demand that scholars should 
not have or express personal opinions is, as Kærgård et al. (2007, p. 29) points out, 
as absurd as requiring politicians to function without “no knowledge of the world”. To 
demand that scientists only speak publicly if they have the ultimate truth will, moreover, 
cause everyone, especially the most honorable ones, to remain silent (Kærgård et al., 
2007, p. 26).
During the 2006 and 2007 debate, it was proposed that scholars should be 
allowed to express themselves publicly about their scientific work only if and when their 
work had been through a peer-review process. This proposal was strongly rejected by 
others, including Kærgård et al. (2007, p. 28), who emphasized that this would make 
sense only in very specific cases. For example: it hardly can consider good scientific 
practice if, immediately the first successful experiment in the laboratory, the scientist 
runs into the streets proclaiming that he has found a new and miraculous medicine. But 
it doesn’t make sense to require that a scholar who wants to participate in the public 
debate on the basis of his scholarly knowledge or who is asked some questions by a 
journalist, cannot do so until having submitted his statements to a peer-review panel.
The scholar-expert, as a matter of course, ought to be capable of serving up 
sober arguments in favor of his interpretations and qualified opinions, but elaborate 
explanations, lots of details and reservations are rarely possible. Footnotes, so to say, 
are not commonly used in mass media, and if Jensen is asked, for instance, to give a 
one and a half minute statement on television on the difference between Sunni- and 
Shia-Islam, then he can, at the most, make a brief remark saying that time prevents him 
from going into any detail. But if he has agreed to participate, i.e. because one and a half 
minute is better than nothing, and because he may actually be good at “boiling things 
down” in such a situation, then it makes no sense to judge his one and a half minute by 
the same standards that apply to a dissertation or article in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Concluding Remarks
In the article “The War in Iraq and the Academic Study of Religion” (2008), Ira Chernus 
praises (cf. above for the criticism of McCutcheon, 2005) Bruce Lincoln (2005) for 
his contribution to the public debate with his historical, analytical-critical studies of 
former US President Bush’s rhetoric (Chernus, 2008). In a closing paragraph, Chernus 
argues, and convincingly so, I think, that it is difficult, if at all possible, to keep separate 
from each other what he, with reference to the terminology used by the American 
Academy of Religion, calls, respectively, “historical/analytic-descriptive analyzes” 
and “constructive-reflective” scholarship. Not just when it comes to a war (in this case 
the US war in Iraq), but also more generally. 
Although Chernus does find a separation between descriptive and prescriptive 
(normative) scholarship both necessary and possible in many cases, he also finds 
it possible to connect Weber’s separation of teacher and preacher with the same 
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Weber’s idea that the scholar/teacher through a presentation of his analysis paves 
the way “self-clarification”. Chernus continues: “The claim that self-clarification has a 
moral value is especially compelling when applied to the political body”, and he then 
goes on to quote Gitlin: “[E]ducation’s prime bond to the public weal in a democratic 
society is to improve the capacity of citizens to govern themselves, and to meet 
this requirement, educators must ‘spur reasoned participation in politics and the 
accumulation of knowledge to suit” (Chernus, 2008, p. 865). Chernus believes that 
it is possible, both in theory and practice, to reconcile “good scholarship” and “good 
citizenship”, and that a scholar of religion such as Lincoln (2005) has managed to do 
exactly that. He ends, with reference to the current US political and cultural situation: 
At such a time, we are particularly called upon to be scholar-citizens, always 
concerned to serve the demands of good scholarship by upholding their 
highest standards but, at the same time, equally concerned with practicing our 
scholarship in the service of good citizenship (Chernus, 2008, pp. 867–868).
I think this can be said with reference to the situation today too, in the US, in 
Denmark, and most other places. But again: in practice, it is not so straightforward to 
realize the effort to, at one and the same time, promote and strengthen the scholarship 
and science/study of religion as well as, at the same time, the pluralistic, enlightened 
and open society. 
It cannot be denied that some scholars may be better than others at doing so, 
without putting their scholarly reputation as well as that of the community of scholars 
and scholarship “as such” at risk. Jensen (and Rothstein) maybe did not strike the right 
balance between the scholar and the engaged citizen, maybe did not master the art 
of communication via the mass media. Moreover, the context for the cases mentioned 
may be said to have been particularly “poisonous” due to the extremely controversial 
cartoon case and the very tense political climate. 
Nevertheless, most of the problems that I have touched upon are not caused 
by personal deficiencies or deficiencies linked to particular “methods”. Rather, they 
are structural, methodological challenges and problems “by default” so to say. It is 
important, I think, to make this clear if scholars really want to learn from the cases, not 
least as regards how to best handle the media now and in the future. And, handling the 
media and sharing scholarly knowledge with the wider society, also by participation in 
the public debate, has, today even more than before, become part of many scholars’ 
everyday lives, something the universities encourage employees to do, something 
that is part and parcel, not of the “modern research university” that Wiebe (2005) 
propagates but of the “post-modern” contract university having to prove itself, its 
employees, its scholarship, and the future candidates produced, of “use” to society 
and societal challenges. 
The cartoon case incidents, on the one hand, have given me a better understanding 
of why Wiebe (2005) really has some good reasons for repeatedly warning about the 
risks associated with “going public”. They have, on the other, also made it clearer to 
me that Wiebe is mistaken if he thinks the scholar-expert can engage in and contribute 
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to public debates with his scholarly based factual knowledge if he only can refrain from 
embracing the role as “public intellectual”. It is not that easy and it is not entirely up to 
the scholar. 
Moreover, the cartoon case incidents, and the developments in Danish society 
in and in societies around the world ever since, have made me even more convinced 
that it is absolutely necessary, that at least some (not all, of course) scholars of religion 
share their knowledge with the community at large. Also, through mass media and by 
way of active participation in public debate. 
The scholar, and the scientific or scholarly study of e.g. religion, certainly always 
risk “losing face”, inwards and outwards, among colleagues and with the public at 
large. But this loss is nothing compared to the loss suffered in regard to the quality 
of the public debate and in regard to the whole ideal of an enlightened democracy 
if (some) scholars of religion do not try to share their approach to religion and their 
knowledge of religion with society and the public at large. Facts (and facts do exist, 
also in regard to religion and the study of it)), qualified opinions, and not least qualified 
questions and problematization of what otherwise appears to be unproblematic, are 
vital to an open democratic, society – and to the freedom of science and scholarship. 
At the same time, I am still also convinced that propagating the science and 
scholarship of religion, not just by writing books and articles for other scholars to read 
in “the ivory tower” but also by way of making science and scholarship of religion known 
to the public at large, thus trying to make it (more) obvious why having universities with 
departments for the study or science of religion is of value. I think it “pays off” in the 
long run, and that the gains by far outweigh the losses that may be the result of, say, 
the damage caused by the abovementioned cases. 
True: the values “at work” within and uphold by the work by scholars inside the 
walls of the academy, in the “ivory tower”, must be nursed and guarded. But this must 
be done at the same time as the work done by scholars trying to share with the public 
at large, whether as expert-scholars, expert-opinion makers, or, maybe one of the 
“safest” ways to do it, by being university teachers for religious education teachers in 
public schools. 
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